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BUSINESS THROUGH ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES 
Chris Rojao* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
According to the United States Census Bureau, in 2008, e-
commerce retail sales accounted for approximately 3.6% of all retail 
sales in the country and generated $142 billion in revenue.1  A study 
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) estimates that in the same year, approximately 73% of all 
electronic retail sales were conducted through online retail 
intermediaries (“online intermediaries”).2  Online intermediaries 
facilitate Internet transactions for new and used goods by connecting 
buyers with suppliers, and they provide a range of services such as a 
platform for auctions, fixed prices, and transaction processing.3  One 
of the largest online intermediaries is eBay.com.4  In June 2011, 223.5 
million people accounting for 16.2% of the world’s Internet 
population visited eBay.5  The increasing use of the Internet and 
online intermediaries—like eBay—by manufacturers and sellers to 
distribute their products across the United States has posed 
significant problems for courts in determining where these 
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advice and comments during the editing process.  I would also like to thank my 
family (especially my Mother), friends, and the F.A.C. for all of their support, 
without which none of this would be possible.  
      1 E-Stats, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/econ 
/estats/2009/2009reportfinal.pdf. 
 2  KARINE PERSET, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL ROLE OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 7 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org 
/dataoecd/49/4/44949023.pdf. 
 3  See id. at 12.  
 4  See Dan Rowinski, Amazon’s Websites Saw 20% of the World’s Internet Users in June, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011,  http://www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2011 
/08/17/17readwriteweb-amazons-websites-saw-20-of-the-worlds-inter-48335.html. 
 5  Id.  
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manufacturers and sellers should be subject to personal jurisdiction 
when conflicts arise out of their transactions. 
State and federal courts have struggled with applying the 
traditional personal jurisdiction analysis and the other specialized test 
for establishing personal jurisdiction over the Internet, the Zippo test, 
to Internet transactions through online intermediaries.6  This 
Comment analyzes the various approaches to establishing personal 
jurisdiction over businesses and individuals that conduct business 
through online intermediaries.  Part II discusses the development 
and expansion of personal jurisdiction from Pennoyer v. Neff to 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson.  Part III explains how some courts have applied these 
traditional principles to personal jurisdiction with regard to Internet 
activity and how others have developed a specialized test for personal 
jurisdiction with regard to Internet activity.  Part IV illustrates the 
problems that courts have faced in applying both the traditional 
principles of personal jurisdiction and the Zippo test for personal 
jurisdiction to out-of-state defendants that conduct business through 
online intermediaries by analyzing relevant case law on the issue.  
Part V establishes a new “online intermediaries test” that combines 
important elements of the Zippo test and the traditional minimum 
contacts analysis and is specifically tailored to Internet transactions 
conducted through online intermediaries.  Part VI applies this new 
“online intermediaries test” to actual and hypothetical scenarios in 
order to demonstrate its practicality.  Part VII concludes, urging 
courts to adopt this approach. 
II.  CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINAL TEST FOR 
ESTABLISHING PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is defined as “a government’s general power to 
exercise its authority over all persons and things within its territory.”7  
This Comment focuses specifically on a court’s power to exercise its 
authority over an individual—personal jurisdiction.  A valuable 
explanation of the concept of personal jurisdiction in its early stage 
of development comes from the 1877 Supreme Court case Pennoyer v. 
Neff.8  The Court in Pennoyer explained that a person would not be 
bound by a court’s judgment unless the court had properly obtained 
 
 6  See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (explaining the challenges that the Internet poses to personal 
jurisdiction analysis).  
 7  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 928 (9th ed. 2009). 
 8  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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power over that individual by statute and under the Constitution.9  In 
1877, most state statutes provided that a court properly obtained 
power over an individual when that individual was either: (1) served 
with process within the territory of the state; or (2) voluntarily 
appeared to litigate in the state.10  The Court in Pennoyer brought 
personal jurisdiction analysis within the confines of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that “proceedings in a 
court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of 
parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute 
due process of law.”11 
As the United States began to grow and develop technologically, 
the expansion of interstate commerce and travel began to pose 
significant problems for courts trying to apply principles from 
Pennoyer.12  Many states responded by finding creative ways to assert 
jurisdiction.  One common example was for a state to pass a statute 
declaring that any individual driving on state highways consents to 
have the state appoint an agent for service of process.13  In Hess v. 
Pawloski, the Supreme Court explained that in order to be valid, these 
statutes must be consistent with the Due Process Clause.14  Then, in 
1945, the Supreme Court clarified this principle when it articulated a 
test for establishing personal jurisdiction over non-consenting, out-of-
state defendants in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.15  The Court 
established this more flexible test based on a defendant’s “minimum 
contacts” with the forum state and the reasonableness of subjecting 
the defendant to the forum state’s jurisdiction based on those 
contacts.16  It also explained that it adopted this test to get rid of the 
“legal fiction” that defendants were impliedly consenting to 
jurisdiction by their “presence in the state through the acts of its 
authorized agents.”17  The Court found this test to be in accordance 
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18  It 
 
 9  Id. at 732.  
 10  Id. at 729–30. 
 11  Id. at 733. 
 12  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–93 (1980) 
(noting that a change in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is attributable to a 
“fundamental transformation in the American economy”).  
 13  See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 
160, 164 (1916). 
 14  Hess, 274 U.S. at 355.  
 15  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 16  Id. at 316.  
 17  Id. at 318. 
 18  Id. at 319. 
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stated that “due process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.’”19 
In International Shoe, the Court also introduced the concepts of 
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction without expressly using 
these terms.20  The Court suggested that jurisdiction would apply to 
individuals and corporations with operations in a particular state that 
are so “continuous and systematic” that they could reasonably be 
subject to jurisdiction in that state, even for disputes that are distinct 
from those contacts.21  Nearly forty years later, in Helicopteros 
Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme Court identified this 
concept explicitly as “general jurisdiction.”22  Recently, in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Supreme Court refined the 
International Shoe standard to require that the contacts be so 
continuous and systematic as to render the defendant “essentially at 
home” in the forum state.23  The Goodyear Court also explained that 
general jurisdiction typically exists where the individual is domiciled 
or the practical equivalent for a corporation.24 
While theoretically viable, the Supreme Court has only 
considered the issue of whether a defendant’s contacts with a forum 
state are so continuous and systematic as to subject him to general 
jurisdiction in that state in three decisions since International Shoe.25  
Alternatively, specific jurisdiction is the legal principle that most 
plaintiffs invoke to subject an out-of-state defendant to personal 
 
 19  Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 20  See id. at 318.  
 21  Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the 
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of 
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities.”).   
 22  Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 
(1984) (“When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not 
arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has 
been said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”) (citing Calder 
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984)); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process 
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80–81 (1980).  Cf. Arthur 
T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 
79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (1966).   
 23  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 
(2011).  
 24  Id. at 2853–54. 
 25  See id. at 2846; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408; Perkins v. Bengeut Consol. Mining 
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
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jurisdiction in a forum state.26  Specific jurisdiction requires that: (1) 
the defendant corporation or individual have sufficient minimum 
contacts with the forum state; (2) the claim against him must arise 
out of or relate to those contacts; and (3) jurisdiction over the 
defendant must be reasonable.27 
Perhaps the main takeaway from International Shoe is that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, provided 
that these prospective defendants have sufficient minimum contacts 
with that state so that bringing the suit does not offend “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”28  In 1980, the Supreme 
Court articulated four factors for determining whether the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is fair and 
reasonable in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.29  The factors 
included: (1) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute”; 
(2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief”; (3) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the 
most efficient resolution of controversies”; and (4) “the shared 
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies.”30  In order for the court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, however, it must have a 
statutory authority granting it the ability to reach out beyond its 
borders.31  Such statutes are widely known as “long-arm statutes,”32  
and in response to International Shoe, all fifty states have enacted these 
statutes or court rules that define the circumstances under which the 
state may exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.33  These 
 
 26  See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2849 (explaining that most of the Court’s decisions 
have focused on circumstances surrounding specific jurisdiction).  
 27  See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 427 (“[A] court’s specific jurisdiction should be 
applicable whenever the cause of action arises out of or relates to the contacts 
between the defendant and the forum.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
318 (1945) (“Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of 
the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a 
state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of 
action unconnected with the activities there.”). 
 28  See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 323–24.  
 29  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).  
 30  Id. at 292. 
 31  Id. at 290–93.  
 32  A long-arm statute is defined as “[a] statute providing for jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant who has had contacts with the territory where the statute is in 
effect.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1027 (9th ed. 2009).   
 33  See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to 
the Limits of Due Process, 84 B. U. L. REV. 492, 493–96 (2004) (explaining the history 
and development of long-arm statutes in response to Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington). 
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statutes can be as expansive as extending the jurisdictional 
boundaries to the fullest extent allowable under the U.S. 
Constitution,34 or limited to requiring either an act or omission to 
occur within the state35 or business to be transacted within the state.36 
Assuming that individuals and corporations are not subject to 
general jurisdiction, and provided that the state has a long-arm 
statute granting it jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, the next 
question that courts were called upon to answer was: how many 
contacts would be enough to satisfy specific jurisdiction under the 
“minimum contacts” test from International Shoe?  The Supreme Court 
addressed this issue in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., in 
which an insurance company, through its regional office located in 
Texas, sold a life insurance policy to a California man.37  When the 
man died, the beneficiary of the policy, Ms. McGee, sued to enforce 
the policy in California.38  The Supreme Court held that one contact—
the insurance contract—was sufficient to establish jurisdiction, even 
though the company had no agents in California nor solicited any 
business there, because the contact was substantial and the dispute 
arose directly from that contact.39 
International Shoe and McGee were somewhat limited by the 
Court’s ruling in Hanson v. Denckla.40  In Hanson, a Pennsylvania 
woman established a trust with a Delaware corporation and 
subsequently moved to Florida.41  When she died, the beneficiaries of 
the trust tried to sue the Delaware corporation in Florida to enforce 
the agreement.42  The Supreme Court rejected the notion that 
Florida had personal jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation, 
stating that “[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with a non-resident defendant cannot satisfy the 
 
 34  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2010) (“A court of this state may 
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state 
or of the United States.”); N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4 (2010) (“[A]ny defendant may be served 
as provided by court order, consistent with due process of law.”). 
 35  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 2010) (“A court of this state having 
jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person . . . [i]n any action 
claiming injury to person or property within or without this state arising out of an act 
or omission within this state by the defendant.”).   
 36  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 1993). 
 37  McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957). 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. at 221–23. 
 40  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).  
 41  Id. at 238–39. 
 42  Id. at 240.  
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requirement of contact with the forum state.”43  The Court went on to 
add an additional feature to International Shoe’s minimum contacts 
test, requiring “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, 
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”44 
This new requirement of purposeful availment created another 
issue for the courts as they tried to determine what type of conduct 
was sufficient to find that the defendant had purposefully availed 
itself of the benefits and privileges of the laws of the forum state.  In 
World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a 
defendant purposefully avails himself of the benefits and privileges of 
a forum state, merely because it is foreseeable that a product he sells 
may end up in that state.45 
Another mechanism for establishing personal jurisdiction over 
out-of-state defendants is often referred to as the “effects test” 
established in Calder v. Jones.46  This test is relevant to this Comment 
because some courts have applied it to Internet transactions 
conducted through online intermediaries.  In Calder, a famous singer-
actor Shirley Jones filed a lawsuit in California against the National 
Enquirer and its writer—both located in Florida—for libel with regard 
to a story they published about her.47  The Supreme Court found that 
the story “concerned the California activities of a California 
resident. . . . was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the 
harm . . . was suffered in California.”48  The Court also found that 
petitioners “edited an article that they knew would have a potentially 
devastating impact upon respondent.  And they knew that the brunt 
of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she 
lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest 
circulation.”49  The Court concluded that “[j]urisdiction over 
petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of 
their Florida conduct in California.”50  As a result of Calder, courts 
have found jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants when their 
conduct is an intentional action expressly aimed at the forum state 
and causes an injury or effect in the forum state.51 
 
 43  Id. at 253. 
 44  Id. (emphasis added).  
 45  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–97 (1980).  
 46  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  
 47  Id. at 784.  
 48  Id. at 788–89.  
 49  Id. at 789–90 (emphasis added). 
 50  Id. at 789.  
 51  See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 256 (3d Cir. 1998); 
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In sum, the Supreme Court has articulated several elements 
necessary for a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant who has not consented to its jurisdiction and does not 
have continuous and systematic contacts that expose him to general 
jurisdiction.  First, the state must have a statutory grant of authority, 
usually in the form of a long-arm statute.52  The defendant must then 
have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that he 
has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of its 
laws.53  In addition, the claim against him must arise out of or relate 
to those minimum contacts.54  Finally, jurisdiction over the defendant 
must be reasonable such that it complies with the “traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.”55  This is essentially the framework 
that courts have attempted to apply to personal jurisdiction cases 
involving activity conducted over the Internet—an area where 
territorial boundaries of Internet activity are ambiguous and an 
individual’s conduct may cause an effect in one state or every state 
almost instantaneously. 
III.  THE BEGINNING OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET: 
ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION OVER OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF 
WEBSITES 
The establishment of the Internet and e-commerce caused 
significant problems for courts trying to apply the minimum contacts 
test to individuals who post information and conduct business over 
the web.56  Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. was one of the first 
cases to address the issue of personal jurisdiction with regard to 
activity conducted over the Internet.57  In this case, plaintiff Inset, a 
Connecticut corporation, sued defendant Instruction, a 
Massachusetts corporation with no employees or offices in 
Connecticut, for trademark infringement based on the defendant’s 
use of the name “Inset” in its website and phone number.58  The court 
 
Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2, 9 (Cal. 2002).  
 52  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1980); 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 718 (1877). 
 53  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 54  See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 
(1984). 
 55  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292; Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. 
 56  See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011); Paul Schiff 
Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 330–31 (2002). 
 57  Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
 58   Id. at 163 (noting that the defendant listed its website as www.inset.com and 
used the toll-free phone number 1-800-US-INSET).  
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applied the traditional minimum contacts analysis and found that the 
defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut 
because the defendant advertised over the Internet and through its 
toll-free number, which “reach[ed] as many as 10,000 Internet users 
within Connecticut alone.”59  The court’s holding received harsh 
criticism and many courts chose not to apply this test because the 
underlying implication was that anyone advertising over the Internet 
could be subject to jurisdiction anywhere the website could be 
accessed.60 
The next case to address the issue of personal jurisdiction with 
regard to Internet communications and transactions was Zippo 
Manufacturing. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., which adopted a more 
restrictive approach.61  In Zippo, a Pennsylvania manufacturing 
company sued a California Internet news service in Pennsylvania for 
trademark infringement based on its use of the name “Zippo” for its 
websites.62  The court aptly articulated the issue before it, stating, “we 
must decide the Constitutionally permissible reach of Pennsylvania’s 
Long Arm Statute . . . through cyberspace.”63  The court then 
reviewed the traditional principles of personal jurisdiction and found 
that “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally 
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of 
commercial activity.”64 
In its decision, the court articulated a sliding-scale test for 
determining whether an individual purposefully avails himself of a 
forum state based on his or her conduct over the Internet.65  On one 
end of the spectrum are active websites where individuals enter into 
contracts and conduct business with residents of foreign 
jurisdictions.66  On the other end are passive websites where 
individuals merely post information that is accessible to others in 
foreign jurisdictions.67  In the middle lie “interactive websites” where 
information is exchanged between the host computer and users of 
 
 59  Id. at 165.  
 60  See, e.g., Vinten v. Jeantot Marine Alliances, S.A., 191 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647 n.10 
(D.S.C. 2002); Digital Control, Inc. v. Boretronics, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 
(W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 61  Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 62  Id. at 1121.  
 63  Id. at 1120–21. 
 64  Id. at 1123–24 (emphasis added).  
 65  Id. at 1124.  
 66  Id. 
 67  Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.  
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the website.68  The court indicated that jurisdiction over out-of-state 
defendants who maintain “active” websites would be proper, whereas 
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who maintain “passive” 
websites would not.69  With regard to “interactive” websites, courts 
would determine jurisdiction “by examining the level of interactivity 
and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs 
on the Web site.”70 
The court explained that personal jurisdiction jurisprudence 
supports the notion that when individuals and corporations 
intentionally reach out to conduct business with residents of other 
states, jurisdiction in those states is proper, and this rationale should 
not change simply because the business is conducted over the 
Internet.71  Conversely, the court stated that an out-of-state defendant 
does not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and privileges of 
the laws of the forum state because users must take it upon 
themselves to act upon that information, by calling the number on 
the site, for example.72  Additionally, the court cited Maritz, Inc. v. 
Cybergold, Inc. as an example of a case involving an “interactive 
website,” and relied on that court’s reasoning that the defendant’s 
website’s active solicitations, promotional activities, and responses to 
users accessing the site made jurisdiction proper.73 
Applying this test to the case before it, the district court found 
that the defendant’s Internet news service websites were akin to 
“active” websites because they conducted substantial business over the 
Internet and provided passwords to “approximately 3,000 subscribers 
in Pennsylvania and entered into seven contracts with Internet access 
providers . . . in Pennsylvania.”74  Next, the court concluded that the 
claim arose out of the defendant’s conduct in Pennsylvania because 
“both a significant amount of the alleged infringement and dilution, 
and resulting injury . . . occurred in Pennsylvania.”75  Lastly, the court 
held that jurisdiction was reasonable in Pennsylvania because of 
Pennsylvania’s interest in adjudicating disputes over infringement of 
trademarks owned by its residents and the plaintiff’s interest in 
 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id.  
 70  Id.  
 71  Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).  
 72  Id. at 1125 (citing Bensusan Res. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)).  
 73  Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124–25.  
 74  Id. at 1126. 
 75  Id. at 1127. 
ROJAO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  2:02 PM 
2013] COMMENT 1085 
choosing to seek relief in the state.76  Accordingly, the court found 
that Pennsylvania had specific jurisdiction over the defendant.77 
Many district and circuit courts have embraced some variation of 
the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo, and some have even gone 
further to incorporate the requirement that defendants “expressly 
aim” or “target” the forum state through their Internet activities.78  
Other courts have criticized the Zippo sliding-scale test or declined to 
apply it in favor of traditional personal jurisdiction analysis.79  
Admittedly, the Pennsylvania District Court’s holding in Zippo was 
generally tailored to entities that run their own websites and use 
those websites to conduct business or to post information and 
advertisements.80  The question that still remains, which has haunted 
courts since the beginning of the twenty-first century, is what happens 
when the entity does not own the website itself, but instead conducts 
business or posts information over a website owned and operated by a 
third-party intermediary, such as eBay? 
IV.  THE ISSUE OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES: ESTABLISHING PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER INDIVIDUALS WHO CONDUCT BUSINESS OVER EBAY 
This Part will discuss cases that have used the Zippo sliding-scale 
test, the traditional minimum contacts test, or a variation of the 
Calder effects test to determine whether personal jurisdiction is 
appropriate over entities that conduct business through eBay as a 
third-party intermediary.  When individuals and corporations 
conduct business through online intermediaries like eBay, it is 
especially difficult for courts to determine when a state will have 
personal jurisdiction over these entities.  The conventional 
problems—such as lack of territorial boundaries for where the online 
activity or effect thereof takes place and the ability of an entity to 
make contact with every state instantaneously—are also present when 
entities choose to conduct business via online intermediaries.81  
 
 76  Id.  
 77  Id.  
 78  See, e.g., ALS Scan Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th 
Cir. 2002); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999); see also A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to the Traditional Principles to 
Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 74 (2006) (analyzing cases 
that have applied the Zippo sliding-scale test to establish personal jurisdiction over 
the Internet). 
 79  See, e.g., Instabook Corp. v. Instantpublisher.com., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124–
25 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Howard v. Mo. Bone and Joint Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 207, 212 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
 80  See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125–26.  
 81  See Arthur R. Miller, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 38 GA. L. REV. 991, 995–96 
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Additionally, since these entities do not own the websites through 
which they conduct their business, they pose separate problems for 
courts trying to apply the Zippo sliding-scale test.  Courts that have 
addressed the issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists over out-
of-state defendants conducting business through online 
intermediaries usually do so in the context of breach of contract, 
fraud, or misrepresentation claims.82 
The archetypical eBay controversy is as follows: seller S puts a 
listing up on eBay indicating that a particular item is for sale for a 
particular period of time.83  Along with this listing, S provides a brief 
description of the item, usually indicating the quality of its condition, 
any special features the product might have, and anything else a 
potential buyer might wish to know about the product.84  Buyers B, C, 
and D then all post “bids” on the item indicating how much they are 
willing to pay for the item.85  At the end of the sale period, buyer B 
has the highest bid on the item and wins the auction.86  S and B then 
arrange to have the product delivered to B’s home, or alternatively, B 
agrees to travel to S to pick up the item.87  When B takes possession of 
the item, the product is not as B expected it to be, based on S’s 
description (or misrepresentation).88  B files a lawsuit against S for 
breach of contract (or fraud) in B’s home state and S argues that the 
court lacks personal jurisdiction.89  State and district courts 
throughout the United States have addressed this situation 
specifically, and others very similar to it, and have either tried to 
apply the traditional minimum contacts approach, the sliding-scale 
test in Zippo, or the effects test articulated in Calder. 
 
(2004). 
 82  See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008); Metcalf v. 
Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221, 1224 (N.H. 2002).  But cf. Winfield Collection Ltd. v. 
McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (providing an example of a 
copyright infringement case based on an eBay transaction).  
 83  See, e.g., Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08-7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009). 
 84  See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1014. 
 85  See, e.g., Karstetter v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex. App. 2006) (explaining 
that out of fifty-seven bids, plaintiff was the highest bidder).   
 86  See, e.g., Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Ky. 2011).  
 87  See Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1014 (noting that plaintiff hired a transport company 
to deliver car from defendant’s home state of Wisconsin to plaintiff’s home state of 
California); Metcalf, 802 A.2d at 1224 (noting that plaintiff buyer traveled to 
defendant’s home state of New Jersey to purchase excavator). 
 88  See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015.  
 89  See, e.g., id. at 1014; Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857 (E.D. Tenn. 
2007); Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 499 (La. Ct. App. 2007), writ denied, 967 
So. 2d 509 (La. 2007). 
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A.  Courts Applying the Zippo Sliding-Scale Test 
In Dedvukaj v. Maloney, the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan applied the Zippo sliding-scale test to answer the question 
of when personal jurisdiction is proper over an out-of-state defendant 
who conducted business through an online intermediary, such as 
eBay.90  In Dedvukaj, the plaintiff, a resident of Michigan, sued the 
defendant, a resident of New York and sole member of “Mr. 
Markdown L.L.C.,” for breach of contract after the plaintiff 
successfully bid on two pieces of artwork that defendant failed to 
provide.91  In the defendant’s listing under the general information 
heading, he listed the “item location” as “Upstate NY, United States” 
and under the “ships to” heading, he listed “United States, Canada, 
Europe, Asia, [and] Australia.”92  The defendant also provided a toll-
free number in the listing for interested buyers to call for more 
information.93  The auctions lasted several weeks, and during this 
time, the plaintiff received email updates about the status of the items 
and the bids entered.94  Additionally, the plaintiff spoke with the 
defendant using the toll-free number posted on the listing about the 
authenticity of the paintings.95 
The court determined that Michigan’s long-arm statute allowed 
for jurisdiction and applied the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo 
to establish the purposeful availment prong of the minimum contacts 
analysis.96  The court prefaced its analysis by explaining the need for 
an expansive view of personal jurisdiction with regard to transactions 
through online intermediaries97: 
Internet forums such as eBay expand the seller’s market 
literally to the world and sellers know that, and avail 
themselves of this greatly expanded marketplace.  It should, 
in the context of these commercial relationships, be no 
great surprise to sellers—and certainly no unfair burden to 
them—if, when a commercial transaction formed over and 
through the internet does not meet a buyer’s expectations, 
they might be called upon to respond in a legal forum in 
 
 90  Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813 (E.D. Mich. 2006).  The plaintiff 
sued the individual defendant and his business, however, for the purposes of this 
Comment, they will be referred to as one singular defendant.   
 91  Id. at 816–17.  
 92  Id. 
 93  Id.  
 94  Id. at 817. 
 95  Id. at 816. 
 96  Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 820.  
 97  Id.  
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the buyer’s home state.  Sellers cannot expect to avail 
themselves of the benefit of the internet-created world 
market that they purposefully exploit and profit from 
without accepting the concomitant legal responsibilities 
that such an expanded market may bring with it.98 
The court then explained why the sliding-scale test in Zippo is 
appropriate to establish the purposeful availment element of the 
minimum contacts test.99  It determined that online-intermediary sites 
could be categorized as interactive, because sellers can determine the 
terms of the sale and post descriptions and pictures of the items for 
sale.100  Additionally, buyers can communicate with other buyers and 
sellers by posting on the listing, and buyers make payments to the 
seller in exchange for the item.101 
Applying this test to the case before it, the court found that the 
defendant had purposefully availed himself of the benefits and 
privileges of conducting business in Michigan.102  The court reasoned 
that the defendant communicated with plaintiff frequently via email 
and telephone about the listing, uploaded pictures and descriptions 
of his items, indicated that he would sell anywhere in the United 
States and in many countries, accepted payment from Michigan, and 
was a sophisticated and extensive user of eBay.103  The court then 
went on to find that the remaining elements of the minimum 
contacts test were met.104  The court determined that the lawsuit arose 
out of and was related to the eBay transaction, and jurisdiction over 
the defendant was reasonable because the defendant’s connection 
with Michigan was substantial and the state had an interest in 
protecting its citizens from fraud and misrepresentation.105  
Accordingly, the court found that Michigan had personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.106 
A review of other decisions where courts have applied the 
sliding-scale test from Zippo provides insight as to relevant factors that 
go toward determining the level of interactivity needed to establish 
the purposeful availment element and whether jurisdiction over the 
defendant is reasonable.  Federal and state courts applying the Zippo 
 
 98  Id.  
 99  See id.  
 100  Id. at 821.  
 101  Id. 
 102  Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 821. 
 103  Id. at 822. 
 104  Id. at 823. 
 105  Id.  
 106  Id.  
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sliding-scale test to determine whether personal jurisdiction is 
appropriate in these situations have ruled both for and against 
defendants.107  First, in Crummey v. Morgan, a Louisiana appellate 
court found that the defendant’s interactivity through electronic 
communications was sufficient to establish jurisdiction in Louisiana, 
where the defendant accepted payment from a Louisiana credit card, 
provided potential buyers with a telephone number, engaged in 
additional conversations with buyers, and used the post to “advertise, 
puff, negotiate, and accept payment.”108  The court also indicated an 
important public policy rationale for finding that personal 
jurisdiction exists over these defendants.109  The court theorized that 
holding otherwise would have a chilling effect on e-commerce 
because buyers, wary of having to litigate in the home courts of out-
of-state sellers, “will refrain from purchasing goods on eBay . . . 
should the merchandise they considered purchasing be defective or 
otherwise not conform to the advertised online representations.”110 
Second, in Hinners v. Robey, the Supreme Court of Kentucky also 
applied the sliding-scale test from Zippo, but it determined that it 
could not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant eBay seller 
from Missouri.111  In Hinners, a Kentucky plaintiff bid on and 
ultimately won the auction for a Cadillac Escalade that the Missouri 
defendant had put up for sale.112  The defendant’s listing stated that 
the Cadillac had no prior accident damage, no electrical problems, 
and was in good condition.113  The plaintiff traveled to Missouri to 
complete the deal and acquire possession of the vehicle.114  Shortly 
after returning to Kentucky with the vehicle, the plaintiff began 
having problems with the electrical system and took it to a mechanic 
who discovered that there had been extensive work done on the car 
due to prior collisions.115  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant 
in Kentucky for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of 
 
 107  See infra Part IV.A.  
 108  Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. Ct. App. 2007), writ denied, 967 
So. 2d 509 (La. 2007). 
 109  See id.  
 110  Id.  
 111  Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 901 (Ky. 2011) (the court considered the 
issue under both the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo and under the traditional 
minimum contacts analysis and came to the same conclusion; however, for the 
purpose of this Part only the Zippo analysis is discussed).  
 112  Id. at 893.  
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. at 894.  
 115  Id. 
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warranty, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted certification.116 
The Kentucky Supreme Court applied the sliding-scale test from 
Zippo and found that the defendant did not purposefully avail himself 
of the privileges of Kentucky.117  The court explained that the 
defendant “did not limit the auction to bidders from Kentucky or 
target his advertisement to Kentucky residents, and in fact could not 
know the resident state of the successful bidder until the auction was 
complete.”118  It stated that the eBay listing was akin to a “passive 
Internet website” that “does little more than make information 
available to those who are interested.”119  Also relevant to its 
conclusion was the fact that the delivery of the item was concluded 
outside of Kentucky.120  Based on this analysis, the court ultimately 
concluded that to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
would be constitutionally improper.121 
Perhaps the most important thing to take away from these cases 
is their use of the sliding-scale test to assess the purposeful availment 
aspect of the minimum contacts test.  As discussed supra in Part II, 
combining the analysis from McGee v. Int’l. Life Ins. Co. and Hanson v. 
Denckla, one contact may be sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the contact is substantial, 
and the defendant purposefully avails himself of the benefits and 
privileges of the forum state through that contact.122  These cases also 
illustrate that courts can apply the Zippo sliding-scale test to 
transactions conducted over online intermediaries to establish the 
purposeful availment prong of the traditional minimum contacts test, 
while still maintaining the other traditional elements of establishing 
personal jurisdiction.123  Each of these cases also required that the 
claim arise out of or relate to the eBay transaction and for 
jurisdiction over the defendants to be reasonable. 
Importantly, in Hinners the court listed relevant factors in 
 
 116  Id. at 893.  
 117  Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 899.  
 118  Id.  
 119  Id. at 901.  
 120  See id. at 894 n.3 (“There is some indication in the record that delivery and 
execution of the paperwork may have occurred in Illinois; however, the relevant 
point is that the delivery was completed beyond the borders of Kentucky, and 
whether it was in Missouri or Illinois is of no significance.”).  
 121  Id. at 903.  
 122  See discussion supra Part II; see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 
221–23 (1958); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).   
 123  See Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Hinners, 
336 S.W.3d at 898; Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 501–02 (La. Ct. App. 2007).  
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considering whether the defendant had purposefully availed himself 
of the benefits and privileges of Kentucky.124  The court stated that 
since the seller did not “limit the auction to bidders from Kentucky,” 
could not know that the winning bidder was a resident of the state of 
Kentucky, did not select the winning bidder, and completed the 
delivery outside of Kentucky, the defendant did not purposefully avail 
himself of the benefits and privileges of conducting business in 
Kentucky.125  Similarly, in Crummey the court listed relevant factors 
supporting its finding that the defendant had purposefully availed 
himself of the benefits and privileges of Louisiana.126  The court 
found that since the defendant expanded his market by using eBay as 
an intermediary, accepted an original down payment for the vehicle 
with a credit card sent from Louisiana, and provided the plaintiff with 
a telephone number to engage in additional communications with 
the defendant, he purposefully availed himself of the protections of 
Louisiana law.127 
Again, in Dedvukaj the court also listed the factors it considered 
relevant to determining that defendant had purposefully availed 
himself of the benefits and privileges of Michigan.128  In making its 
decision, the court considered the fact that the defendant stated that 
he would deliver his paintings anywhere in the United States, that the 
defendant provided the plaintiff with a phone number and email 
address in order to contact him, and that he provided his own terms 
and conditions, logos, and marketing information in the listing.129  
These cases effectively illustrate which factors courts will consider as 
relevant to determining whether an out-of-state defendant who 
conducts business through an online intermediary has purposefully 
availed himself of the benefits and privileges of a forum state in order 
to establish personal jurisdiction over that defendant.130 
B.  Courts Applying Traditional Minimum Contacts Analysis 
Some courts, however, have refused to abandon the traditional 
approach in resolving the issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists 
over an out-of-state defendant conducting business through an online 
intermediary.  The Ninth Circuit applied traditional personal 
 
 124  See Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 894 n.4, 899–900.   
 125  Id.  
 126  See Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 504. 
 127  Id.  
 128  Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822.  
 129  Id.  
 130  See discussion infra Part V.  
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jurisdiction analysis in resolving this issue in Boschetto v. Hansing.131  In 
Boschetto, the plaintiff, a California resident, used eBay to purchase an 
antique car from the defendant, a resident of Wisconsin.132  The 
parties communicated through email and arranged to deliver the car 
to California from Wisconsin.133  Upon receiving the car, Boschetto 
realized that the car was not the specific “R Code” model that the 
defendant advertised and found other significant problems with the 
engine and body of the car.134  Boschetto subsequently sued the 
defendant in California for breach of contract and fraud.135  The 
court expressly stated that the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo 
was inapplicable in this type of situation because the defendant did 
not own or operate the eBay website.136 
The court equated the eBay listing to an advertisement, stating 
that “the eBay listing was not part of broader e-commerce activity; the 
listing temporarily advertised a good for sale and that listing closed 
once the item was sold, thereby extinguishing the Internet contact 
for this transaction within the forum state (and every other 
forum).”137  Thus, the court applied the traditional minimum contacts 
analysis articulated in International Shoe to the online transaction and 
found that defendant’s one sale over eBay to the California plaintiff 
was not a sufficient contact to allow the court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.138  The court did note, however, that 
a defendant who conducts business over eBay might be subject to 
personal jurisdiction in a forum state when he uses eBay “as a means 
for establishing regular business with a remote forum such that 
finding personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”139 
One potential benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Boschetto 
is that it is consistent with traditional long-range transactions that do 
not involve the Internet, and courts can look to case law that 
addressed these situations for support and guidance as to how much 
contact with the forum state is sufficient.  The court’s holding, 
however, poses a number of potential problems as well.  First, if the 
defendant was actually wrong and made a number of 
 
 131  Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d. 1011 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 132  Id. at 1014.  
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. at 1015.  
 135  Id. at 1014–15.  
 136  Id. at 1018.  
 137  Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018.   
 138  Id. at 1020.  
 139  Id. at 1019 (internal quotations omitted).  
ROJAO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  2:02 PM 
2013] COMMENT 1093 
misrepresentations in the description of the vehicle, the plaintiff may 
have no recourse, as the cost of traveling to Wisconsin to litigate may 
be too burdensome for the individual plaintiff.  Additionally, the 
court failed to address the significance, if any, of the communication 
via email that the parties exchanged in arranging the delivery of the 
car to California and whether or not that communication may 
contribute towards the defendant’s minimum contacts with 
California. 
Once again, reviewing other courts that have applied the 
traditional minimum contacts tests in these types of situations reveals 
relevant factors that these courts consider in deciding whether the 
defendant’s contacts with the state are sufficient and whether it is 
reasonable to subject the defendant to jurisdiction.  Federal and state 
courts in other jurisdictions following this approach have generally 
found that the contacts through the online intermediaries were 
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, describing them as attenuated, 
random, and fortuitous.140  Notably, many of these courts rely on the 
fact that the defendant has “no control over the winning bidder,” and 
as a result, the contact with the forum state is random and 
fortuitous.141  This view, however, ignores reality.  In fact, sellers are 
able to control who (or at least where) the winning bidder will be.  
Sellers are able to control the information that is posted in the 
“description” and “shipping and payments” sections of their listings 
on eBay.142  Sellers may choose which forum states they will agree to 
ship to and with whom they will conduct business.143  Most sellers, 
however, seek to maximize the number of potential buyers and 
increase the sale price of their item, intentionally choosing to avail 
themselves of the benefits of conducting business with every state. 
At least one court has applied the traditional minimum contacts 
test to an out-of-state defendant conducting business over eBay and 
found that personal jurisdiction was appropriate.144  In Malcolm v. 
Esposito, the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, won an auction to purchase 
a car on eBay from the defendants, agents of a car dealership located 
 
 140  See, e.g., Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 751 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000); Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08-7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *3–4 
(N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009); MacNeil v. Trambert, 932 N.E.2d 441, 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2010).   
 141  See Payment & Shipping, EBAY.COM, http://pages.ebay.com/help/pay/shipping-
costs.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).  
 142  See id.  
 143  See id. 
 144  Malcolm v. Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2003). 
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in Connecticut.145  After the auction ended, the parties contacted 
each other by email and phone and the defendants arranged to ship 
the car from California to Virginia.146  Before the defendants shipped 
the car, the plaintiff discovered a manufacturing defect with the car 
and tried to cancel his purchase of the vehicle, but the defendants 
refused to allow the plaintiff to revoke the agreement.147  The plaintiff 
subsequently sued the defendants in Virginia for fraud and breach of 
warranty.148 
The court first concluded that the Virginia long-arm statute 
allowed the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendants because 
the “formation of the contract for sale of the [car] occurred in 
Virginia.”149  Turning to the constitutional inquiry, the court found 
that the Zippo sliding-scale analysis was not “particularly instructive” 
because it primarily dealt with defendants who operate and conduct 
transactions through their own website.150  Accordingly, the court 
applied the traditional minimum contacts analysis.151  The court listed 
several factors that were relevant to its decision: (1) the defendants 
were commercial sellers of the item and had conducted over 213 
transactions to many different states through eBay; (2) the 
defendants represented that they had eBay customers locally, 
nationally, and internationally; (3) the defendants anticipated 
transactions with out-of-state buyers because they sent an email to the 
plaintiffs requesting a copy of the plaintiff’s driver’s license if he was 
an out-of-state resident; and (4) the nature of the product, an 
automobile, was intended to be delivered to and driven in Virginia.152  
Based on an analysis of these factors under the traditional minimum 
contacts test, the court found that jurisdiction over the defendants in 
Virginia was proper.153 
 
 
 145  Id. at 441.  
 146  Id.  
 147  Id. 
 148  Id.  
 149  Id. at 442–43 (“The Virginia long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part, that 
“(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by 
an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s . . . (2) Contracting to 
supply services or things in this Commonwealth.”). 
 150  Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 445.  
 151  Id. at 444–46. 
 152  Id. at 446.  
 153  Id. at 444, 446.  
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C.  Courts Applying the Calder Effects Test 
At least one court has attempted to apply an effects test similar 
to the one in Calder to determinations of personal jurisdiction over 
out-of-state defendants who conduct business through online 
intermediaries.154  In Erwin v. Piscitello, the plaintiff, a resident of 
Tennessee, purchased a classic automobile advertised as being in 
“mint condition” from the defendant, a resident of Texas.155  The 
plaintiff and the defendant made and received several calls about the 
car, during which the defendant reinforced the quality and condition 
of the car.156  The defendant ultimately delivered the car to the 
plaintiff in Tennessee through his own driver and car hauler.157  Two 
days after the plaintiff received the car, he discovered it was not in 
mint condition and several of the original parts had been replaced, 
contrary to the defendant’s representations.158 
The court first explained that Tennessee’s long-arm statute 
allowed for personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under 
the United States Constitution and as a result merged the 
constitutional and statutory analyses.159  The court then applied an 
effects test and concluded that the defendant had purposefully 
availed himself of the benefits and privileges of Tennessee’s laws.160  
The court found that the defendant “knowingly interacted with a 
Tennessee resident” and persuaded the plaintiff to purchase the 
vehicle based on representations about the vehicle that were 
ultimately discovered to be untrue.161  In doing so, the court 
emphasized that “[the defendant’s] knowing and intentional conduct 
caused foreseeable ill effects in-state.”162  Based on these factual 
determinations, the court concluded that it was “reasonably 
foreseeable for Defendant to be haled into court in Tennessee when 
the transaction soured.”163 
Most courts have chosen not to discuss whether an effects test is 
applicable in the context of Internet transactions through online 
intermediaries like eBay.164  Instead, these courts have chosen to 
 
 154  See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  
 155  Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 856–57 (E.D. Tenn. 2007). 
 156  Id. at 856. 
 157  Id. at 857.  
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. at 858–59. 
 160  Id. at 860. 
 161  Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860. 
 162  Id. at 861.  
 163  Id.  
 164  See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018–20 (9th Cir. 2008); 
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address this issue under the Zippo sliding-scale analysis or under the 
traditional minimum contacts analysis.165  At least one court has 
explicitly declined to follow the analysis set forth in Erwin in the 
context of establishing personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant who conducts business through an online intermediary.166  
Additionally, the court in MacNeil v. Trambert discussed the difficulty 
of trying to apply the effects test to Internet transactions over online 
intermediaries like eBay.167  First, the court indicated that the “effects 
doctrine” is generally applied to intentional tort cases, and thus is 
inapplicable to breach-of-contract cases in the eBay context.168  This 
means that the effects test would only be applicable to fraud and 
misrepresentation cases.169  Next, the court pointed out the difficulty 
in establishing the location of the tortious act in a multi-state 
transaction, whether it occurs when the defendant accepts payment 
for the defective good or when the plaintiff obtains possession of the 
defective good.170  Consequently, if the plaintiff chooses to pick up 
the defective good in the defendant’s state, or authorizes an agent to 
do so, the location of the acceptance of payment and deliverance of 
possession would both be in the defendant’s state.171  As a result, the 
plaintiff would have no recourse in his own state and would have to 
travel to the defendant’s state to file his lawsuit. 
Currently, Erwin is the only case that has used the effects test to 
find personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant conducting 
business through online intermediaries.  Although it is only one case, 
Erwin illustrates that an effects test remains a viable option for courts 
to consider in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over 
an individual who conducts business over eBay or some other online 
intermediary.  But as the court in MacNeil pointed out, applying this 
test in the context of Internet transactions through online 
intermediaries can be problematic.  Until courts adopt a more 
uniform standard for establishing personal jurisdiction under these 
circumstances, courts will continue to struggle in determining which 
analysis to apply and which factors are relevant to assessing the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction. 
 
Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 819–21 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Crummey v. 
Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 503–04 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 165  See supra Part IV.A–B. 
 166  See Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 903 (Ky. 2011).  
 167  See MacNeil v. Trambert, 932 N.E.2d 441, 447–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  
 168  Id. at 447.  
 169  Id.  
 170  See id. at 447–48. 
 171  See id. at 448.  
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V.  THE “ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES TEST” 
A review of the existing commentary on this issue illustrates that, 
just like the courts, scholars and commentators disagree about what 
the proper test should be under these circumstances.172  Some 
commentators argue that courts should stick to the traditional 
minimum contacts analysis for long-range transactions and not get 
distracted by the fact that the business was conducted over the 
Internet on the eBay website.173  One commentator suggested that 
state legislatures should amend their respective state’s long-arm 
statutes to preclude personal jurisdiction over out-of-state residents 
who conduct business over third-party websites such as eBay and 
Amazon.174  Other commentators have suggested that general 
jurisdiction could apply to the actual websites of eBay or Amazon.175  
In line with this argument is the question of whether these websites’ 
most prominent users could also be subject to general jurisdiction if 
through these online intermediaries, they have continuous and 
systematic contacts with every state in the United States.  This would 
mean that jurisdiction would be proper over these “super-sellers” in 
any state where a buyer files a claim against them.  No commentator, 
however, has argued in favor of creating a specific test for online 
intermediaries by incorporating a modification of the Zippo sliding-
scale test along with elements of the traditional minimum contacts 
test. 
An analysis of the relevant case law on establishing personal 
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who conduct business 
through online intermediaries makes clear that the best test for 
establishing personal jurisdiction is one that combines and 
implements the most important elements of the prevalent cases.176  
The following online-intermediary test combines many elements 
from the cases previously mentioned.177  First, it applies principles 
from the Zippo sliding-scale test and looks at the interactivity and 
features of the bid, post, or listing on the online intermediary to 
determine whether the defendant has purposefully availed himself of 
 
 172  See discussion infra Part V. 
 173  See, e.g., Personal Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts Analysis—Ninth Circuit Holds 
that Single Sale on eBay Does Not Provide Sufficient Minimum Contacts with Buyer’s State.—
Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1014, 1021 
(2009).   
 174  Ryan T. Holte, What is Really Fair: Internet Sales and the Georgia Long-Arm Statute, 
10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 567, 589 (2009). 
 175  See Miller, supra note 81. 
 176  See discussion supra Parts IV.A–C. 
 177  See discussion supra Part IV.  
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the forum state.178  Then, it maintains the requirements of the 
minimum contacts test that the conflict must (1) arise out of or relate 
to the transaction; and (2) that jurisdiction over the defendant must 
be reasonable.179 
The most fluent articulation of this test, derived from Dedvukaj,180 
Hinners,181 and Crummey182 is as follows: an out-of-state defendant who 
conducts business over a third-party intermediary, such as eBay or 
Amazon, is subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum state when: (1) 
that defendant has sufficient minimum contacts whereby he 
purposefully avails himself of the benefits and privileges of the state 
as determined by the level of interactivity available to potential buyers 
in the forum state through the listing; (2) the claim against him arises 
out of those contacts; and (3) after an analysis of the relevant factors, 
jurisdiction over the defendant is reasonable such that it complies 
with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.  The 
unique aspect of this approach derives from determining whether the 
defendant purposefully avails himself of the forum state by looking at 
the interactivity of the post or listing on the online intermediary 
itself.  As previously mentioned, eBay users and users of similar 
online intermediaries have a significant amount of control over the 
information they post in their listing and how the transaction is 
ultimately concluded.183  The more passive the seller is in posting 
information, arranging for shipping, and soliciting potential buyers 
in various states through his or her listing, the less likely the 
defendant will have purposefully availed himself of a forum state 
where his product is ultimately sold and vice versa. 
In all of the cases where courts have struggled to determine 
whether personal jurisdiction can be established over an out-of-state 
defendant that conducts business through an online intermediary, 
these courts have mentioned several factors that are considered 
relevant to the inquiry.184  After reviewing these cases, it is now 
possible to determine which factors courts cite most frequently and 
 
 178  Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 
1997). 
 179  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–19 (1945).  
 180  Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 181  Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891 (Ky. 2011). 
 182  Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 183  See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 184  See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018–20 (9th Cir. 2008); Erwin 
v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 860–61 (E.D. Tenn. 2007); MacNeil v. Trambert, 
932 N.E.2d 441, 446–47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Malcolm v. Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2003).   
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give the most weight to in reviewing this issue.  These factors are 
intended to serve as a guide for future courts reviewing this issue.  
Courts that have applied one of the three articulated personal 
jurisdiction tests have come to different conclusions in factually 
similar cases because they differ on one or two of the factors listed 
below.185 
The following factors that courts should consider in determining 
whether the defendant’s bid is sufficiently interactive such that he or 
she purposefully avails himself or herself of the forum state are: (1) 
the number of transactions between the seller and the forum state 
through the online intermediary;186 (2) whether and to what extent 
the defendant coordinates and pays for the product to be shipped to 
the buyer’s home state, physically or through an agent who delivers 
the product to the buyer’s state, or whether the defendant requires 
the buyer to come to the defendant’s state to take possession of the 
product;187 (3) whether the defendant posts contact information such 
as an email address, website, or telephone number in the bid and 
intends to make contact with buyers in the forum state in ways other 
than through the listing on the intermediary;188  (4) whether the 
defendant knows the buyer’s location, establishing that he has 
knowledge that he is conducting business with the forum state;189 and 
(5) whether the defendant is an individual or corporation who 
frequently conducts business through online intermediaries.190  
Courts addressing the issue of out-of-state defendants conducting 
business through online intermediaries have cited these factors most 
frequently as relevant to its determination of personal jurisdiction. 
The “reasonableness” element of the test is also an important 
inquiry that courts should not overlook.  The online-intermediaries 
test borrows the traditional factors from World-Wide Volkswagen in 
determining whether jurisdiction over the defendant would be 
reasonable as to comply with the “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”191  These factors include: (1) the burden that 
 
 185  See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018–20; Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61; 
Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 819–21; Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 899–902; MacNeil, 932 
N.E.2d at 446–47; Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 503–04; Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 446 (2003).   
 186  See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018–19; Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 902.   
 187  See, e.g., Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61; Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822. 
 188  See, e.g., Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822; MacNeil, 932 N.E.2d at 447; Crummey, 
965 So. 2d at 503–04. 
 189  See, e.g., Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61; Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822; 
Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 503; Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 446. 
 190  See, e.g., Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822; Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 446. 
 191  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (internal 
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litigation will have on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in 
the litigation; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; and (4) 
the national judicial interest in securing an efficient resolution of the 
dispute.192  The value of the product that forms the basis of the 
transaction should also be relevant to this inquiry.  The statutory 
requirement that a matter must exceed $75,000 for federal diversity 
jurisdiction will prevent many claims from reaching federal courts; 
however, state courts should be hesitant to require a defendant to 
travel across the country to defend himself over an inexpensive 
contract dispute.193 
VI.  APPLYING THE ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES TEST IN REAL AND 
HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS 
The following example illustrates the practicality and feasibility 
of the online-intermediaries test.  Consider the facts of Erwin v. 
Piscitello.194  The issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists over the 
defendant in Erwin can be resolved with the same outcome under the 
online-intermediaries test.  In Erwin, the plaintiff viewed the 
defendant’s eBay post for a car for sale and used the information in 
the post to email the defendant to inquire about that car, to which 
the defendant responded.195  Had that been the full extent of the 
defendant’s communications with the plaintiff, he would not have 
purposefully availed himself of Tennessee law under the online-
intermediaries test.  The defendant, however, chose to re-initiate 
contact with the plaintiff and sent a number of emails and phone 
calls to the plaintiff seeking to gauge his interest in the car.196  
Additionally, when the defendant discovered that the plaintiff would 
not be able to pick the car up in Texas as previously believed, the 
defendant arranged for a car hauler to deliver the car to the 
plaintiff’s home in Tennessee.197  From the communications and the 
fact that the seller arranged to deliver the car to Tennessee, it is 
evident that the defendant knew he was dealing with a plaintiff from 
Tennessee.198 
Based on these facts, the defendant in Erwin purposefully availed 
 
quotation marks omitted). 
 192  Id.  
 193  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).  
 194  See supra Part IV.C. 
 195  Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 856 (E.D. Tenn. 2007).   
 196  Id. at 857. 
 197  Id. 
 198  See id. 
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himself of the benefits and privileges of Tennessee by interacting with 
the plaintiff buyer on multiple levels.  The next inquiry, whether the 
claim arises out of the transaction, is easily satisfied because the claim 
arises out of the dispute over the condition of the car.199  Finally, 
looking at whether jurisdiction over the defendant would be 
reasonable, the facts show that Tennessee has a strong interest in 
protecting its citizens from fraudulent misrepresentations, that the 
defendant was easily able to secure transportation for the car to 
Tennessee, and that the car was worth a substantial amount.200  As a 
result, under the online-intermediaries test, personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant for the dispute regarding the car would be appropriate 
in Tennessee. 
 An alternative hypothetical example illustrates when personal 
jurisdiction would not be appropriate over an out-of-state defendant 
conducting business through an online intermediary.  Suppose a 
seller lists a bullwhip201 on eBay that Harrison Ford used to portray 
the character “Indiana Jones” in the movie Raiders of the Lost Ark.202  
The defendant is a resident of New Jersey, an attorney by profession, 
and has only used eBay once before to sell his mother’s fine china to 
a buyer from New York.  In his eBay listing, he includes a brief 
description of the whip, indicating that Harrison Ford used it in the 
film and stating that the buyer is responsible for pickup or delivery 
and must pay all shipping costs from New Jersey.  The potential buyer 
is an avid movie buff who lives in Idaho and is always on the lookout 
for movie relics on eBay and other auction sites.  The buyer sees the 
listing and decides he must have the whip.  The buyer then submits a 
bid for $15,000 and after one week, he wins the auction.  When the 
buyer receives the whip, he questions its authenticity after watching 
the movie with his whip in hand.  The buyer brings a lawsuit against 
the seller in Idaho for breach of contract and fraud based on the 
alleged misrepresentations in the eBay listing. 
Through an application of the online intermediaries test, a court 
in Idaho would not be able to establish personal jurisdiction over the 
seller.  The seller never made a sale to Idaho through eBay before, 
and his previous sale of fine china to New York is not sufficient to 
establish that the he is engaged in the business of selling movie relics 
or fine dishware through online auction sites.  The seller did not post 
 
 199  See id. at 860.  
 200  See id. at 856. 
 201  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 151 (10th ed. 1998) (A bullwhip 
is “a rawhide whip with a very long plaited lash”).  
 202  RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount Pictures 1981).  
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any contact information in the post indicating that he would attempt 
to contact individuals by other methods other than through the eBay 
listing.  Additionally, he indicated that the plaintiff was responsible 
for the pickup or delivery and subsequent costs of the item from New 
Jersey.  Even though the seller chose not to limit his sale to any 
specific state but instead allowed his bullwhip to be sold anywhere in 
the United States, this factor alone is not sufficient to overcome the 
other factors that indicate he has not purposefully availed himself of 
the benefits and privileges of Idaho.  Thus, through this passive 
conduct, the seller never purposefully availed himself of the benefits 
and privileges of conducting business in Idaho, and therefore, he 
cannot reasonably expect to be haled into court in Idaho to defend 
against this lawsuit. 
These examples show that courts can practically apply the 
online-intermediaries test to different factual scenarios involving 
transactions conducted through eBay or other online intermediaries 
with relative uniformity.  The more sellers choose to engage buyers in 
a particular forum state through their listing and communication and 
negotiation outside of the listing, the more likely they will be subject 
to personal jurisdiction in that state.  Conversely, the more passive 
they are in listing and soliciting communication and interest from 
potential buyers outside of the posts by only responding to buyer 
inquiries, the less likely they will be subject to personal jurisdiction.  
This test still allows sellers to exploit the benefits of selling their 
products through an online intermediary such as eBay and to protect 
themselves from liability in a foreign jurisdiction.  It provides, 
however, that if they choose to actively solicit and target customers in 
a foreign state or conduct a significant amount of business with a 
foreign state through that intermediary, then they cannot claim that 
it is unreasonable for them to be called into court in that state.  As a 
result, this online intermediaries test strikes an appropriate balance 
of reasonableness and fairness. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Upon reviewing the relevant case law regarding personal 
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who conduct business with 
the forum state over online intermediaries, it is clear that there is a 
lack of uniformity amongst courts.  Notably, almost all courts have 
maintained some or all of the elements of the traditional minimum 
contacts analysis for determining personal jurisdiction in these 
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cases.203  Some courts have maintained all of the elements from 
International Shoe Co. and applied them to these situations, with the 
majority of these courts finding that one or two sales with the forum 
state is insufficient to establish minimum contacts to establish 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant seller.204  Others have 
applied the sliding-scale test in Zippo based on the interactivity of the 
commercial business to satisfy the purposeful availment element of 
the minimum contacts analysis.205  These courts have found both for 
and against establishing personal jurisdiction over these defendants 
based on the level of interactivity they provide in their listings and 
advertisements.  One court has found that if the actions of these 
defendants conducting business through these online intermediaries 
caused an effect in the forum state, then even one contact with the 
forum state might be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.206 
This Comment argues for an analytical test, which combines the 
two major approaches to this issue.  Courts should apply the sliding-
scale test articulated in Zippo to determine whether the defendant has 
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of the 
forum state through his contacts of the sale listing.  Next, courts 
should determine whether the claim arises out of or relates to the 
contact.  Finally, these courts should determine whether jurisdiction 
over the defendant would be reasonable such that it would comply 
with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” based on 
the factors articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen.207 
Courts and commentators have struggled with the issue of how 
to assert personal jurisdiction over individuals who conduct business 
over online intermediaries since immediately after the creation and 
increase in popularity of third-party intermediary sites like eBay and 
Amazon.  This approach is a push toward uniformity in an area of 
much disparity and disagreement.  This “online intermediaries test” 
seeks to provide guidelines for buyers and sellers conducting business 
 
 203  See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018–20 (9th Cir. 2008); Erwin 
v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 860–61 (E.D. Tenn. 2007); MacNeil v. Trambert, 
932 N.E.2d 441, 446–47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Malcolm v. Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2003).   
 204  See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018–19; Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08-
7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009); Winfield Collection Ltd. v. 
McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 748–49 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 
444–46. 
 205  See, e.g., Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 821–22 (E.D. Mich. 2006); 
Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221, 1225–27 (N.H. 2002); Crummey v. Morgan, 965 
So. 2d 497, 503–05 (La. Ct. App. 2007), writ denied, 967 So. 2d 509 (La. 2007). 
 206  Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–62.  
 207  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
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over online intermediaries to know exactly where they may be called 
upon in a court of law to address issues with regard to their purchases 
and sales. 
